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Comment / Cigarettes, Cancer and the
Implied Warranty of WholesomenessLartigue v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco CompanyGreen v. American Tobacco Company
"... [A] custome lothsome to the eye, hatefull to the Nose,

harmful to the braine,daungerous to the lungs, and the black
stinking fume thereof, neerest resembling the horribleStigian
smoke of the pit that is bottomelesse." *
*KING JAMES I, COUNTERBLASTE To TOBACCO, (1604).

that our legal headlines are dominated by a number of controversies over public law, one area of private litigation has consistently managed to capture its share of publicity. Attempts by smokers who develop lung
cancer to fasten liability for their hurt upon the great tobacco companies are
often in the news, and will continue to be for years to come.'
These cases are complex, and present a host of legal problems. The complaint may be based on negligence, on express or implied warranty, or on violation of a statute.2 The added problems of statutes of limitations, possible
defenses, privity, scope of warranty, causation and a number of others make
cigarette-cancer litigation a tort battlefield of epic proportions.
Two recent cases, Lartigue v. R. J.Reynolds Tobacco Co.8 and Green v.
American Tobacco Company,4 bring into sharp focus the issue to which this
comment is devoted. Both Green and Lartigue are suits to recover for wrongful death caused by cancer suffered as a result of cigarette smoking; neither
case brings privity into issue, 5 and both opinions involve at least a presumpDESPITE THE FACT

I There have been four appellate court opinions in such cases; at least twenty cases are
pending in trial courts at the time of writing. There are 40,000 deaths per year in the United
States from lung cancer, and the great majority of these. victims are cigarette smokers. It is
apparent that there are many potential plaintiffs in such suits. See, generally, THE CONSUMER'S
UNION REPORT ON SMOKING AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST (1963).
See Rossi, The Cigarette-CancerProblem: Plaintiff's Choice of Theories Explored, 34 So.
CAL. L. REv. 399 (1961).
8317 F. 2d 19 (5th Cir., 1963).
'154 So. 2d 169 (Fla., 1963).
Both cases consider tobacco as a product intended for intimate bodily use, and therefore
analogous to food and drink. By applicable state law, no requirement of privity exists to bring
a warranty suit under these circumstances. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS §402A, Tentative Draft No. 7 (1962).
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tion of causality. 6 The point of departure of the two opinions is their disagreement over the scope of a manufacturer's implied warranty of wholesomeness.
The Green case takes the position that the warranty extends even to those injuries which are not foreseeable as a result of scientific knowledge and human
experience at the time of the sale; the Lartigue case holds that the warranty
extends only to the type of injury which is foreseeable as a possible result of
the sale at the time it is made. The purpose of this comment is to contrast
these cases, and to attempt an evaluation of their conflicting viewpoints.
Before discussing the facts of the cases, some preliminary distinctions should
be drawn. The cigarette-cancer case is not the usual product liability case, in
which the plantiff claims that the product was defective in some way; these
cigarettes were admittedly up to commercial standards. As cigarettes, they
were not defective. Nor are these cases similar to cases in which the plaintiff
claims that the manufacturer knowingly sold a product containing recognized
allergen without a warning to the consumer, who suffered injury because of
his abnormal sensitivity to it. Rather, these cases involved a claim upon a different level-the plaintiff contends that the cigarettes, although up to the
usual standards of quality, contained a substance harmful to the normal human body. Cigarette-cancer cases seem to be the only cases which have ever
advanced such a claim.
I
Frank J. Lartigue, the husband of the plaintiff in the Lartigue case, was a
heavy smoker for fifty-five years. He died of lung cancer, which the plaintiff
alleged was caused by his use of the defendant's products. She based her claim
on breach of warranty and negligence, and after a long trial with voluminous
medical testimony,7 lost on a general verdict for the defendant. The judgment
of the trial court s was appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit, mainly upon the ground of asserted error in the charge to the
jury. The trial judge charged the jury that the law of Louisiana 9 implies a
warranty of wholesomeness "only as to those qualities of which a manufac0 The jury specifically found causality in the Green case. In Lartigue, the verdict for the
defendant was general, but the Fifth Circuit's opinion proceeded upon the presumption that
the jury might have found causality.
I The decedent's medical record itself is of some interest. Testimony indicated that during
his life he suffered from constant sore throat and coughing, measles, pertussia, diphtheria,
malaria, influenza, tonsilitis, pyorrhea, muscular pain, gonorrhea, syphilis, tuberculosis and
rheumatism. It is quite possible that the jury found for the defendant because of lack of proof
of definite causal connection between decedent's lung cancer and his death. The general verdict gives no hint of the reasoning behind it.
8The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, Herbert W. Christenberry, J.
9Jurisdiction was based upon diversity of citizenship; under the Erie doctrine state law
controls.
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turer can have knowledge in the exercise of reasonable diligence, the absence
of which causes damage that is reasonably foreseeable." 10
The Court of Appeals affirmed, stating that although the language of this
charge may savor of negligence, the words are also appropriate to convey to
the jury the scope of an implied warranty of wholesomeness. This warranty is
an absolute undertaking, but the law extends it only to a certain limit, continued the court, and this limit is the area of possible damage foreseeable at
the time of the sale. The court based this holding upon the proposition that
the implied warranty is grounded in the superior position of the manufacturer, relative to the consumer, to know of dangerous defects in the products,
and to guard against them.1 ' When this basis for the liability is found to be
non-existent, the court reasoned that the law must cease to imply the warranty.
The Court was of the opinion that the liability of a manufacturer must end
somewhere, and "Louisiana draws the line at unknowable risks. For strict lia2
bility to apply, there must be foreseeability of harm."'
Green v. American Tobacco Company,13 a long and complicated lawsuit,
began in 1957 when Edwin Green filed suit against the defendant, alleging
that his use of its product had resulted in lung cancer. 14 He died several
months later, and his administrator, who was substituted as plaintiff, added a
claim for wrongful death to the complaint. The suit was based upon a number
of grounds, including breach of implied warranty. After a long trial, the jury
found, in answer to specific interrogatories that Green had cancer, that he
died from the cancer, and that the defendant's product had caused the disease.
The trial judge also propounded another interrogatory, asking whether the
defendant could have known, by reasonable application of human skill and
foresight, when the sales were made, that the use of cigarettes could cause
cancer. The jury answered this interrogatory in the negative, and the court
entered judgment for the defendant.
An appeal was taken, again to the Fifth Circuit, and the decision below was
affirmed, largely upon the grounds of the decision in the Lartigue case. 15 On
rehearing the court became uncertain as to its previous interpretation of the
Florida law, so it certified the question to the Supreme Court of Florida 16 for
an authoritative pronouncement on the state law.
The Florida court answered that the liability of a manufacturer of products
10Lartigue v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Company, supra, note 3, at 23.
11Id. at 39.
12Id. at 36.
13
Supra, note 4.
14The trial court was the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida,
Emmet C. Choate, J. Jurisdicton was again based on diversity of citizenship, so Florida law
ruled.
10304 F. 2d 70 (5th Cir., 1962).
"This procedure is authorized by Sec. 25.031, F.S.A.
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for human consumption upon breach of an implied warranty was absolute,
and extended even to the type of damage which was scientifically unforeseeable at the time of the sale. 17 The superior position of the manufacturer, relative to the consumer, to know of defects and to guard against them is only one
of a number of policy considerations involved in such a warranty. The extent
of this superior position, taken alone, does not define the limits of the warranty. The basis of the liability is a policy decision that risks of unwholesomeness are to be borne by the manufacturer, and not the public, since the manufacturer has undertaken to supply, at a profit to himself, products to be used
18
for human consumption.
The Florida court's decision in Green and the Fifth Circuit's view in Lartigue represent opposing viewpoints on the scope of a manufacturer's liability
for unwholesome products. The importance of this issue will undoubtedly
grow as science finds new and previously unsuspected causative links between
the use of various products and diseases. In order to weigh the relative merits
of the two positions, an inquiry into the history of the liability and the policy
reasons for its imposition is necessary.

II
The history of the liability which these plaintiffs sought to impose upon the
tobacco companies is by no means free of doubts and ambiguities. Starting
with the assumption that tobacco is to be treated for present purposes as food
or drink, 19 which is a conclusion reached by both principal cases, we must venture back into feudal days in England to find the source of liability of vendors
of unwholesome food.20 This liability far antedated the warranties of merchantability and fitness for the purpose, which are contained in our modern
law of sales.21 The purveyor of unwholesome foods was liable civilly upon
either of two bases, violation of ancient criminal statutes (a sort of medieval
negligence per se doctrine), or for a failure to show the degree of skill prevailing in his trade, the remedy for which was an action on the case. 22 Significantly,
both of these bases of liability sounded in tort, rather than in contract.
The next step in the development of the liability of a seller of food was the
appearance of the action for breach of warranty. Originally, this action lay for
23
breach of an express undertaking only, and the action was upon the case. It
11Supra, note 4, at 171.
18 Ibid.

11Supra, note 5.
10
See Hamilton, The Ancient Maxim Caveat Emptor, 40 YALE L.J. 1133 (1931).
21
UNIFORM SALEs ACT §15. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §2-314, 315.
2
23

Prosser, Strict Liability to the Consumer, 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1103 (1960).
Ames, The History of Assumpsit, 2 HARV. L. REv. 1, 8-10 (1888).
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was looked upon as analogous to deceit, and the line dividing a breach of warranty from a deceit was far from clear.
About the middle of the eighteenth century, the action to enforce a breach
of warranty came to be enforced in most cases by a count for an assumpsit, due
to the almost invariable coincidence of a contract of sale. 24 However, it was
recognized, and still is, that an action for tort was also a proper remedy.2 5 The
only warranties enforceable were still express ones; the law had not yet begun
to imply warranties not expressly agreed to by the parties.
In the early nineteenth century, the familiar warranties of our sales law first
made their appearance. 26 The most significant of these for our purpose is the
implied warranty of merchantability, by which the seller undertakes as a matter of law to provide goods up to the usual commercial standard of that particular product.2 7 In the case of food or drink, merchantability certainly included
wholesomeness, and so the old remedies gradually fell into disuse, or were
merged into the new concept of merchantability. The law of liability of a vendor of food or drink remained fairly static until our own century, when drastic
changes began to take place.
Thus far, it should be noted that liability was attached only to the "vendor," and the only proper plaintiff was the "vendee." In other words, privity
of contract was a requisite to entertainment of an action for breach of warranty. The salient point in the development of the law in our times is the
abandonment of this requirement, thereby allowing the injured consumer to
sue directly the manufacturer or processor of the unwholesome product.
The first step in the crumbling of the "citadel of privity" came in products
liability cases based on negligence, when Justice Cardozo buried the rule of
privity under the exception of "dangerous instrumentality. ' ' 28 Certainly there
could be no more dangerous instrumentality than negligently prepared food,
and the minority view, that no privity need be shown to establish liability for
29
negligence by a food manufacturer, rapidly became the almost universal rule.
The extension of the abandonment of privity to strict liability, regardless of
negligence, came somewhat more slowly. This was due to the identification of
strict liability with warranty, and the connection of warranty to contract. But
the tide was not to be turned, and gradually state after state entered the "strict
24Stuart v. Wilkins, 1 Douglas 18 (1778) was the first case to hold such a count good.

2 In 1797, Lord Kenyon spoke of a breach of warranty as a form of fraud in Jendwine v.
Slade, 2 Esp. 572 (1797). In modern days, the tort rule of damages has been used, Greco v.
S. S. Kresge Co., 277 N.Y. 26, 12 N.E. 2d 557 (1938), and the tort statute of limitations applied,
Schlick v. New York Dugan Bros., 175 Misc. 182, 22 N.Y. S. 2d 288 (1940).
10The leading case is Gardiner v. Gray, 4 Camp. 144, 171 Eng. Rep. 46 (1815).
2 See generally, Prosser, The Implied Warranty of Merchantable Quality, 27 MINN. L. REV.
117 (1943).
2 MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
21 Prosser, op. cit. supra, note 22 at 1100.
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liability without privity" camp,3 0 until now this is clearly the majority rule in
3
the United States in food and drink cases. '
The difficulties over establishing this "no privity" rule are the result of the
generations-long habit of lawyers and judges of thinking of warranty liability
as a matter of contract, despite the fact that the historical origin of the liability
is in tort. There is at present a trend in the law, supported by the Restatement
of Torts (2nd), and advocated by the eminent Dean Prosser, to recognize strict
liability on a warranty without privity as what it actually is, a species of tort
liability, and to abandon the talk of contract which has confused the real issues for so long.3 2 However, the tendency of the courts today is still to talk in
terms of "warranty without privity," as is illustrated in the 1963 cases under
discussion here.
III
In announcing the rule of strict liability for a manufacturer of unwholesome
products for human consumption, regardless of negligence and privity of contract, the courts have all too often failed to explain the reasons for adopting it,
and relied merely upon the naked assertion that "public policy demands this
rule." 33 Some courts and a number of writers have analyzed the problem more
deeply, and have announced specific reasons for the strict liability rule. These
reasons must now be examined to see whether they continue to apply to a situation in which the manufacturer could not know of the risk created at the
time of the sale, because of lack of scientific knowledge connecting the product
and the injury caused.
The reasons for strict liability without privity rule are by no means free of
controversy, but it is not the purpose of this comment to discuss their merits or
defects. 3 4 Rather, assuming that strict liability does exist for these reasons, the
purpose here is to inquire into whether or not there is justification for extending the liability to the facts found by the jury in the Green case.
It is unfortunate for several reasons that this problem has first arisen in connection with the relationship between cancer and cigarette smoking. The situation has been so highly publicized, and has so much economic significance,
that objective judgment and perspective on this precise legal issue are rather
difficult. Further, it appears that there is little, if any, factual basis for the de10One writer has collected no less than twenty-nine different legal theories on which this
result was justified. Gillam, Products Liability in a Nutshell, 37 ORE. L. REv. 119, 153-55
(1957).
' Prosser, op. cit. supra, note 22 at 1109-10.
82Id. at 1133-34, and note 5, supra.
83E.g. Mazetti v. Armour & Co., 75 Wash. 622, 135 Pac. 633 (1913).
"See generally, Symposium on Strict Liability of Manufacturers, 24 TENN. L. REV. 923
(1957) for opinions pro and con; also Prosser, op. cit. supra note 22 at 1114-1124.

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. XIII

fense in question in these cigarette cases. 35 However, the jury in the Green case
specifically found that the type of injury was unforeseeable, and the court's
opinion in Lartigue assumes that the jury may have so found. For present purposes, therefore, the defense must be considered as factually established.
One of the strongest arguments for strict liability is the belief that fear of
such liability will spur research and precautions by the manufacturer to improve the safety of his product. 36 Here, it is submitted, the Florida court can
find some support for its refusal to except unforeseeable types of injuries from
strict liability. Fear of such liability would provide a powerful incentive for
manufacturers to conduct constant scientific research into the qualities of
their products. The benefits of such activity to medical science and humanity
are obvious. However, these benefits must be considered in conjunction with
the economic burden which will be thrust upon industry.
This leads to the second powerful argument for strict liability, which is the
concept of spreading the loss caused by the injury by making the manufacturer
liable to the consumer. The entrepreneur can then adjust the price of the
product to provide a fund for insurance or damage payments, and thereby
prevent the imposition of the loss upon the injured person alone.3 7 Here, the
argument for liability regardless of the foreseeability of the type of injury can
find little comfort. It is impossible to spread a risk one does not know exists.
Once the risk of the type of injury becomes known, it is, of course, possible to
spread it, but the situation has then moved from the shadow of our hypothetical into the bright sunlight of unquestioned liability. Since a manufacturer
cannot spread an unknown risk, this argument in our case boils down to "let
the rich defendant bear the loss," which is neither wise in terms of economics,
nor in accord with our notions of justice.
Perhaps the most often encountered view of the basis of strict liability is the
argument that the manufacturer is in a superior position, relative to the consumer, to know of defects and guard against them. 38 As the Florida court in
Green pointed out, this is only one of a number of policy considerations.39 It is
not the whole story, as is shown by the numerous cases holding a retail vendor
liable for selling unwholesome canned goods, 40 a case where this argument is
' The medical evidence collected in the

CONSUMER'S UNION REPORT ON SMOKING AND THE

PUBLIC INTEREST (1963), pp. 1-57, makes it quite clear that the risk of cancer from smoking
cigarettes was foreseeable a full generation ago. The fact that the industry chose, and still
chooses, to ignore or try to discredit the medical evidence does not change the fact that this
risk has been foreseeable for many years.
18Prosser, op. cit. supra,note 22 at 1119. See also Symposium, 24 TENN. L. REv. 923, supra
note 34, for a variety of views on the weight of this argument.
11See concurring opinion of Traynor, J., in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453,
462, 150 P. 2d 436, 441 (1944).
a' The Fifth Circuit cites a number of cases advancing this argument in its Lartigue and
Green decisions. E.g., Cliett v. Lauderdale Biltmore Corp., 39 So. 2d 476 (Fla., 1949).
'1 Green v. American Tobacco Co., supra note 4, at 171.
,0 E.g., Sencer v. Carl's Markets, 45 So. 2d 671 (Fla., 1950).
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clearly inapplicable. Similarly, it cannot be applied to the situation where the
risk is scientifically unknowable, for this state of facts negatives the basic premise of the whole argument. The manufacturer cannot know any more of the
danger than can the consumer. This argument provides no basis for the holding of the Florida court.
A number of courts have merely announced the rule that public policy demands that manufacturers who put products on the market, acting from a
profit motive, must be liable if the consumer is injured as a result. 41 It has
been pointed out that this argument "in the last analysis rests upon public
sentiment," 42 and it is therefore rather difficult to pin down for analysis. Does
public sentiment demand an absolutely safe product, or a product as safe as
the utmost utilization of scientific knowledge can produce? The reasonable
person can rightfully expect the latter only, and the exception to strict liability argued for by the Fifth Circuit appears to be justified upon this basis for
strict liability.
Finally, the strict liability of the manufacturer has been founded upon the
view that the manufacturer, by offering his product for sale, represents it to be
suitable and safe for use. 43 This is undoubtedly true, but the next questions
are what the consumer reasonably understands by this representation, and
how far he is entitled to rely upon it. Again, it is submitted that a reasonable
man expects only a product perfected to the degree of scientific knowledge
available. Since the consumer knows that no manufacturer can give more than
this, he cannot reasonably expect more.
In summary, the only policy support for the absolute view expressed by the
Florida court can be found in the incentive such liability would provide for
scientific research by manufacturers to improve the safety of their products.
The majority of the policy reasons advanced for strict liability fail when applied to a fact situation where, at the time of the sale, scientific knowledge and
human experience give no warning of the risk of injury eventually suffered.
IV
However desirable the result reached in the Green case by the Florida court
may be when applied to cigarette-cancer cases, it is submitted that the rule announced there is too broad, and lacking in sound policy basis.
While the Circuit Court perhaps lent too much emphasis to the factor of
the superior position of the manufacturer vis a vis the consumer to know of
defects, it was on firm ground when it stated that the risk of unforeseeable
41

E.g., Jacob E. Decker & Sons v. Capps, 139 Tex. 609, 164 S.W. 2d 828 (1942).

u Prosser, op. cit. supra note 22 at 1122-1123.

" E.g., Jacob E. Decker & Sons v. Capps, supra note 41 at 832-33.
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kinds of injury is not properly considered a risk created by the business, and
44
that therefore there should be no liability.
The Florida court's rebuttal of this point was superficial, stating that the
liability of a retailer who sells unwholesome canned goods was analogous to
the facts under consideration. There is a basic distinction between the two situations. The risk of making people sick by selling unwholesome canned food
is known to every retailer; it is the type of risk he knowingly creates when he
enters the retail food business. There is a considerable difference in holding a
manufacturer liable for risks he had no idea he was creating at the time he sold
the goods.
The Fifth Circuit, it is believed, has laid down the better reasoned rule of
law on the scope of an implied warranty of wholesomeness, however unfortunate the jury's application of that rule to the facts of the case may have been.
The Florida court, perhaps influenced by the disparity between the finding of
fact that the defendant could not foresee the risk he created and the almost
undeniable historic facts to the contrary,45 has laid down a rule which is difficult to justify in terms of policy. It is hoped that a reconsideration of this rule
in light of the reasons for imposing such a warranty will be forthcoming if and
when the attempt is made to attach warranty liability to a manufacturer for a
truly unforeseeable type of damage.
MICHAEL F. O'DONNELL

"Lartigue v. Reynolds, supra, note 3, at 36, discusses the problem in terms of what Professor Ehrenzweig has called the "typicality" of the damage. "Put in more ordinary language,
this means the foresecability of the harm."
" Note 35, supra.

